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Abstract—This paper tackles the problem of detecting a com-
prehensive set of sensor faults that can occur in IoT-instrumented
smart homes customized to infer Activities of Daily Living
(ADL) from the activation of sensor sets. Specifically, sensors can
suffer faults that (a) span durations that vary between several
seconds to hours, (b) can result in both missing or false-alarm
sensor-events. Previous fault detection approaches are geared
primarily to identify missing faults (absence of sensor readings)
of a permanent (very long-lived) nature, or sporadic false-alarm
events. We propose DetectIF, a fault-detection framework that
detects faults of varying time duration, and identifies both missing
and false-alarm sensor events. DetectIF’s key novelties include
developing rules capturing spatiotemporal correlations among
sensors and augmenting those rules with statistical properties of
such sensor-specific behavior. To test DetectIF under a variety
of fault behavior, we develop a unified fault framework where
the tuning of a couple of parameters allows us to generate and
inject faults of desired type and duration into an underlying
sensor stream. Experiments with such comprehensive fault data
shows that DetectIF achieves 82-95% fault-detection accuracy,
improving precision by a huge amount (33-66%) over compet-
itive, state-of-the-art baselines. Moreover, we demonstrate the
benefits of applying DetectIF on unmodified, benchmark smart
home datasets: it is able to detect additional likely faults that
prior fault detection approaches miss, and thus consequently
achieve an average of 30% higher ADL recognition accuracy
compared to prior state-of-the-art fault detection techniques.
Index Terms—Smart home, IoT sensors, Transient Faults,
Unified Fault Detection, Activities of Daily Living
I. INTRODUCTION
Automatic monitoring of Activities of Daily Living (ADLs)
is a cornerstone for many smart home applications related to
wellness monitoring and elderly care [1], [2]. Such ADL mon-
itoring typically leverages on a variety of deployed IoT devices
(such as passive infrared (PIR) motion/light sensors, cabinet-
mounted contact sensors & cameras). While machine learning-
based techniques for ADL recognition given sensor data have
been widely explored, relatively little attention (e.g., [3], [4])
has been given to the problem of understanding how incorrect
or missing sensor data affects such ADL recognition. Such
impairments in sensor data can occur due to a variety of
factors, such as network failures, sensor hardware failures or
environmental artifacts (e.g., a motion sensor occluded by a
piece of furniture).
In this work, we develop, and demonstrate the benefits from,
an improved and unified fault detection mechanism for such
smart home settings, where sensors are often heterogeneous
and perform event-based reporting (in contrast to conventional
wireless sensor networks or WSNs, where sensors are often
homogeneous and perform value-based reporting). Broadly
speaking, sensor failures can manifest in distinct ways, cat-
egorized by either duration or type:
• Duration: Faults can have potentially three types of
durability: (a) permanent, often due to hardware dam-
age, where the sensor stops functioning irreversibly; (b)
sporadic or random, which often manifests itself in sin-
gleton outlier values for value-based sensors (e.g., a room
thermostat that suddenly reports a single data point as
“100◦C” while otherwise reporting values of 22-24◦C); or
(c) transient, where the fault usually persists for moderate
durations (e.g., a few minutes to several hours) and is
caused by some external or human artifacts.
• Type: Broadly, the fault type can be either (a) missing,
where the sensor does not report an event when it should,
or (b) false-alarm, where the sensor fires incorrectly, even
in the absence of an actual underlying event.
Past work on fault detection in such environments has
focused primarily on permanent, missing faults–i.e., scenarios
typically characterized by a hardware failure and a consequent
absence of any firings/reports from the faulty sensor. However,
empirical evidence suggests that false-alarm events, especially
of a transient nature, are not uncommon in smart homes [5],
[6]. For example, [7] described how motion sensors have
faulty activations due to the presence of bright sunlight re-
flecting off walls– this phenomenon is clearly transient (e.g.,
occurring only during the afternoons) and may have seasonal
variations as well (e.g., occurring only during summers).
Similarly, humans can inadvertently put an obstruction (such
as glass) in front of the sensor, accidentally dislodge the sensor
or even move a sensor-equipped furniture item [8], thereby
causing a sensor to behave erroneously for a while.
Our proposed approach, called DetectIF1, is designed to
find and isolate both missing and false-alarm faults (of vary-
ing duration) in a unified manner, and thereby significantly
improve the accuracy of sensor-based ADL recognition. De-
tectIF is based on two key insights: (a) Similar to Idea [3],
1Detection of IoT Faults
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we exploit the fact that each individual ADL is associated
with a spatiotemporal activation pattern of multiple distinct
sensors, implying that an individual sensor failure is likely to
manifest as an anomalous pattern of collective sensor behavior.
However, unlike Idea, failure in DetectIF does not mean just
missing sensor readings, but also incorporates possible false-
alarm faults. (b) We note that different ADLs are characterized
not just by the activation of multiple event-based sensors,
but also by distinctive temporal properties (e.g., number of
ON/OFF transitions) of individual sensor events. Accordingly,
DetectIF incorporates an additional set of such statistical tem-
poral features to help identify a broader range of anomalies.
Our key contribution is the development of an Activity-
Weighted approach to help DetectIF detect multiple classes of
faults in heterogeneous IoT deployments. The approach works
by mining a set of high-confidence, high-support association
rules from historical patterns of ADL-induced sensor activa-
tion, and then determining when the test data, for a given
ADL segment, deviates significantly from the mined patterns.
To cater for the variety of faults, DetectIF association rules are
augmented to include several key statistical temporal features
about a sensor’s reporting pattern. The Activity-Weighted
approach computes the deviation scores for each ADL label
separately, even though the inferred activity labels for each
segment itself are estimated from the underlying noisy data
and can thus be erroneous.
A key obstacle to our work is the lack of empirically-
derived, generic fault models that span a wide variety of
sensor failures. Accordingly, we first meticulously design a
unified fault model, that can parametrically capture a wide
variety of failure types, and evaluate DetectIF by suitably
injecting synthetic faults into multiple existing smart home
datasets. We demonstrate that the Activity-Weighted DetectIF
can identify such faults with an accuracy ranging between
82-95% (across the datasets), as well as isolate the fault
duration fairly precisely (Intersection-over-Union (IoU) val-
ues of 69%-91%). We also show that DetectIF outperforms
previously-proposed competitive baselines [3], [6], achieving
large improvements in precision (33 - 66%) and recall (20
- 40%) in fault detection across a wide variation (20 sec-60
min) in fault duration Secondly, we apply DetectIF on the
unmodified smart home datasets to identify additional likely
faults that past approaches fail to isolate (e.g., transient faults)
and quantify the performance gain. We show that DetectIF
helps identify significant additional unique sensor faults than
previously diagnosed, and consequently helps improve state-
of-the-art ADL recognition accuracy by as much as 42% over
the unmodified data (and, on average, average by 30% over
prior competitive baselines).
II. BACKGROUND & PRELIMINARIES
We first summarize the various datasets used to subse-
quently evaluate our techniques and outline the different types
of faulty behavior that a sensor may manifest.
A. Dataset
Our work uses benchmark datasets (which include times-
tamped ground truth labels for the relevant ADLs) from 7
smart homes which have been widely utilized in prior smart
home-related research, including 5 single-resident facilities
and 2 multi-resident (2 occupants) homes. Table I summarizes
the salient characteristics of these datasets. The first three
datasets {kA, kB, kC} [9] are single resident homes with
only binary-valued, event-driven sensors that generate output
only when the sensor value changes state. The sensors include
passive infrared (PIR) sensors attached to lights/wall/ceilings
to detect motion, contact sensors (reed switches) on cabinets
and doors to detect their usage, and float sensors to measure
the flush of the toilet. The next four datasets collectively
captured the interleaved ADLs from the Washington State
University’s CASAS smart home project [10], including (a)
two single-resident houses (labeled as Ar and Ml) equipped
with both event-driven (such as motion & door sensors) and
non-binary, value-based sensors (temperature), and (b) two (T1
and T2) two-resident facilities. T1 & T2 had similar sensors as
AR & Ml, as well as additional binary contact sensors attached
to cupboards and various items, and value-based sensors that








kA KasterenA [9] 1 25 16 (283) 14 (2006)
kB KasterenB [9] 1 15 25 (172) 27 (22595)
kC KasterenC [9] 1 19 27 (254) 23 (39861)
Ar Aruba [10] 1 219 11 (6477) 39 (805268)
Ml Milan [10] 1 82 15 (2310) 33 (288498)
T1 Twor9-10 [10] 2 249 25 (3745) 100 (711421)
T2 TworSmr [10] 2 63 8 (1016) 100 (366075)
TABLE I: Summary of the 7 smart home Datasets (single
and two-user) – their duration, number of unique ADLs
and activities performed by the user (s), number of sensors
deployed and sensor activations (Events) recorded.
Fig. 1: Sample sensor readings in different activity segments
B. Observations
From the datasets, we see a typical pattern of ADL-driven
sensor activation: when a resident performs an activity, her
movement and object interactions cause multiple sensors to
generate binary/numeric values. For example, motion and door
sensors generate binary values when a door is opened, while
value-based sensors (e.g., temperature and power sensors)
generate numeric values continually. Figure 1 illustrates how
various sensors are triggered during three distinct activity
segments (Cook Breakfast, Eat Breakfast, and Eat Dinner),
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along with the corresponding manually-annotated ground truth
ADL history. We see that every sensor reading is associated
with a timestamp, a sensor ID, and a corresponding value.
Moreover, note that the same sensor can be triggered more than
once in an activity segment (e.g., “M006” was activated twice
during the single instance of the Cook Breakfast ADL). The
duration of the ADLs performed by users also exhibits a wide
variation. While most activities last between 6-10 minutes
(median), the minimum ADL duration is often in seconds
(for ADLs such as Get Drink, Personal Hygiene), while the
maximum duration can extend to several hours, for ADLs such
as Leave House, Sleeping.
C. Unified Fault Model
We aim to build a unified failure detection framework, that
can detect both missing and false-alarm faults, of varying
durations. Isolated fault models have been proposed before–
e.g., transient fault models in sensors such as shaft encoders
and GPS [11], and sporadic/permanent fault models for binary
smart home sensors [3], [6], [12]. To develop the unified
DetectIF framework, we extend these to create a unified fault
model, which accommodates the different types of failures in
event-based smart home sensors. Moreover, given the lack of
explicitly annotated fault data in the benchmark datasets, such
a model helps us to generate and inject synthetically-generated
faults to quantitatively study DetectIF’s performance.
We maintain a sensor dictionary (set of all sensors oper-
ating in a particular smart home) whereby each sensor si is
represented by a tuple < si, ri, Ti > where ri = {0..1} is
the reliability score of the sensor (higher reliability implies
a better operation) and Ti is the mean failure time. To inject
faults, we first divide the sensor stream into one-minute time
slots. We then choose a parameter n, which represents the
maximum fraction of sensors that can be simultaneously faulty.
At each time slot, we then choose a number k uniformly
at random from {0, 1, . . . , |S|} (|S| is the total number of
sensors), and designate k of the total set of sensors as
‘faulty’. The likelihood of an individual sensor being selected
is proportional to its reliability score, with the fault likelihood
being higher for sensors present (in the original trace) in that
slot compared to sensors absent in the trace–this ensures that
the failure likelihood is more equitably distributed.
A chosen “faulty” sensor is then assumed to remain in
the faulty state for the next ti time slots. The choice of t
igives rise to faults with 3 distinct temporal properties: (a)
Sporadic/Random: here ti = 1, i.e., a sensor fault lasts only
for one single time unit, with faults having no correlation
across different time slots; (b) Transient: in this case, ti is
exponentially distributed with an average value Ti, where
1 ≤ Ti ≤ ∞; and (c) Permanent: In this case, time ti = ∞
,
i.e., once the sensor enters a faulty state, the state will persist
without explicit manual intervention.
D. Three Types of Faults:
A sensor chosen to be faulty for ti time slots can exhibit
two broad fault types: missing or false-alarm. For both binary
and numeric/value-based sensors, missing faults are simulated
by causing the sensor not to fire (or generate a report)
when it should. False-alarm faults are simulated by generating
phantom readings (extremal value in case of numeric sensors)
even though there is no actual underlying event. The faults
can be further classified into two distinct ADL-dependent
types {atypical, spurious}, based on whether the sensor s is a
member (or not) of Ŝi, the set of sensors that are associated
with the corresponding ADL Ai. Thus this results in 3 distinct
fault types (illustrated in Figure 2) elaborated next.
(a) A sensor s ∈ Ŝi is said to exhibit a missing fault if it fails
to report values that should legitimately be present. For
example, a motion sensor may be blocked temporarily
because of an obstruction and may not report any motion
activity within its sensing field.
(b) A sensor s ∈ Ŝi is said to exhibit an atypical (false-alarm)
fault if: (i) s is a sensor that, under normal behavior, fires
at least once during the occurrence of a specific ADL Ai;
however, (ii) the behavior of s is currently inconsistent
with historical data observed during past instances of
activity Ai. For example, consider an ADL “Watch TV”,
where a motion sensor typically activates only during the
start and at the end of the activity. However, because of
bright sunlight reflecting off the opposite wall, the sensor
can report continued motion throughout the activity.
(c) A sensor s /∈ Ŝi is said to exhibit a spurious (false-
alarm) fault if it is activated and reports values, even
though it should not have been present at all during ADL
Ai. For example, a pet animal may trigger a kitchen
door/cupboard sensor, even though the human resident
is performing a “Showering” ADL and is nowhere in the
vicinity of that cupboard.
Fig. 2: Different types of Faults. Assuming S2 is present in the
original activity segment Ai, (a) S2 may be missing (the top) due to
some anomaly, (b) S2 may be present but exhibiting atypical, and
(c) Another sensor S5, which reports but is not associated with Ai
is termed as spurious.
III. DETECTIF: PROFILING NORMAL SENSOR BEHAVIOR
Our fault/anomaly detection approach is based on the as-
sumption that faults manifest abnormal patterns (both missing
and false-alarms), which are inconsistent with prior historical
data. The overall DetectIF approach thus has two distinct
phases: (a) an initial Training phase (which we detail in
this section), where past historical data is mined to build up
profiles/rules of normal sensor behavior, and (b) a subsequent
Online Detection phase (which is explained in Section IV),
where future streams of observed sensor data are analyzed
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Fig. 3: Overall Architecture of Activity-Weighted DetectIF [illustrated with 2 ADLs].
to identify anomalous deviations from such profiles. Figure 3
illustrates the various steps in DetectIF.
More specifically, inspired by Idea [3], we utilize two
insights: (a) An activity (ADL) usually involves the activation
of multiple sensors. Accordingly, each ADL typically has one
or more patterns of spatiotemporal correlation among multiple
sensors (refer Figure 1); and (b) Given that the underlying
ADL patterns are reasonably consistent (e.g., the number
of ‘fridge open’ events does not vary dramatically across
different ‘Cooking’ ADL instances) the overall spatiotemporal
activation (or reporting) pattern of the associated sensors is
also fairly regular in the absence of faults. Accordingly, the
training phase involves the creation of a set of extended
association rules, using the Frequent Itemset Mining [13]
(FIM) algorithm. We assume that the sensor stream (used
for training) has already been partitioned into distinct ADL
segments using a state-of-the-art event segmentation technique
(such as [14]–[16]).
A. Basic Association Rules
The input to the FIM algorithm consists of a set of segments,
the values the constituent sensors exhibit within that segment,
along with the annotated ground truth labels of the segments
(e.g., ‘Cooking’, ‘Eating’). We partition the segments into
γ ADL-specific master segment sets (one for each of the γ
distinct ADL labels), and FIM is independently applied to each
of these γ segment sets.
Association Rules: Given a specific master segment set, if the
sensors {s1, s2, s3, . . . , si, sj} co-occur in at least one of the
segments, the FIM rules (Rl’s) are written in the following
format:
Rl :: {s1, s2, s3, . . . , si} =⇒ sj :: support : confidence (1)
where s1, s2, . . . , si, sj are the sensors, (s1, s2, . . . , si) and sj
are the antecedents and the consequent respectively. Support
defines the fraction in the training dataset (activities) con-
taining {s1, s2, . . . , si} and sj , while confidence denotes the





support(X), where X =
{s1, s2, . . . , si}, and Y = sj .
B. Augmentation with Statistical Features
Unlike prior anomaly detection approaches, the DetectIF
process computes and creates augmented association rules
that include a few additional statistical features related to the
activation pattern of each sensor.
Statistical Features for Binary (Event) Sensors: If a sensor
(s) is a binary sensor (and s ∈ Rl), then the following values
are computed separately for each ADL segment: (a). sRlnon &
sRlnoff , the number of times the sensor s switched to the ON
and OFF states, respectively. (b). sRldon & s
Rl
doff
, the total time
duration (within the ADL segment) for which the sensor was
s in the ON and OFF states, respectively. Subsequently, we
compute the following 6 statistical features (for each sensor
s ∈ |S|), across all the segments in the master segment set:








that the mode can be a set of distinct values, in case the
distribution is multi-modal.
Finally, we aggregate these features into a 6-element feature













Statistical Feature for Numeric (Value) Sensors: For value-
based sensors, we determine an appropriate ‘typical’ value
through quantization unlike binary sensors. First, the raw read-
ings are used to compute the standard deviation, which yields
the quantization unit (a bin size B). Subsequently, each sensor
reading (across all segments in the master segment set) is nor-
malized into the range (0, 100) by multiplying the raw value v
by the normalizing factor N(v) = 100∗ (v−min(S))max(S)−min(S) (where
max(S),min(S) represent the largest and smallest observed
value of S), and then quantizing this normalized value into
one of the B bins through the transformation N(v)∗B100 . The
‘typical value’ sSF (Rl) is then obtained by finding the mode






C. Extended Association Rules
Finally, we augment each of the FIM-derived associa-
tion rules to incorporate these additional statistical features
(sSF (Rl)). The final extended rule is in the form of –












At the end of this training phase, we thus have a set of
extended association rules, one for each of the γ ADL labels.
We designate this set of rules as the master rule set.
IV. DETECTIF : IDENTIFYING & CORRECTING FAULTS
We now detail DetectIF’s mechanism for detecting and
classifying sensor faults into three types {missing, atypical,
spurious}, given a test ADL segment. We use three distinct
types as the atypical and spurious cases result in distinct sensor
cleaning techniques (Section IV-D). The Activity-Weighted
approach of DetectIF assumes that an existing state-of-the-
art activity recognition algorithm (e.g., [17]–[19]) is first used
to provide the probability pi that the segment is associated
with ADL Ai (i = {1, . . . , γ}). Figure 3 illustrates the steps
in our approach, while Algorithm 1 outlines the formal steps.
ALGORITHM 1: DetectIF: Fault Identification and Detection
Data: Sg: A list of test segments of sensor events
Rl: Extended Rulebase in the form of〈
















//each Ac has its own set of Rl’s ∈ [RLAc].
for i← 0 to |Sg| do
S ← {s1, s2, s3, . . . , sn} //sensors in Sg
AC: List of predicted activities: {Ac1, Ac2, . . . , Acn}
for Ac← 0 to AC do
for Rl← 0 to |RL| do
Rulescore = supportRl ∗ 1/(1− confidenceRl)
If s = consequent(Rl) is Atypical
sAtypscore ← sAtypscore +Rulescore
ElseIf s = consequent(Rl) is Missing
sMissscore ← sMissscore +Rulescore
Else for s← 0 to |S| do
Determine if s ∈ S is Spurious
sSpuscore ← sSpuscore +Rulescore
end
sAtypscore = sAtypscore + sAtypscore ∗ P (Ac),
sMissscore = sMissscore + sMissscore ∗ P (Ac),





Given a test activity segment Sg, we first shortlist a
set of relevant rules [RL] from the given master rule set
associated to the corresponding Activity (Ac), such that for
each rule Rl ∈ [RLAc], antecedents(Rl) ⊆ sensors(Sg)
(the set of sensors in Sg), and Regularity(s, Sg,Rl)= 1;
∀s ∈ antecedents(Rl).
Regularity(s, Sg,Rl): Given an activity segment Sg that
is associated with a shortlisted rule Rl (s ∈ Sg
& s ∈ Rl), the binary-valued regularity score checks
whether the behavior of sensor s during the segment
Sg conforms to its statistical values expressed in a rule
Rl. Assume that the activity segment Sg is given by
{sa, sa+1, · · · sa+i, sa+i+1, · · · , sa+k}, where sa to sa+i are
binary sensors and sa+i+1 to sa+k are numeric sensors. The
statistical features for this test segment can be represented by




a+i+1 , · · · , sSga+k}.
For a binary sensor s ∈ Sg & s ∈ Rl , we define
Regularity(s, Sg,Rl) = 1 (Regularity=0 otherwise) if,(a) its
total number of ON/OFF switches is within the std. dev. of
the corresponding mean values, AND (b) its total ON/OFF





































Similarly, for a value sensor s ∈ Sg and s ∈ Rl
Regularity(s, Sg,Rl) is 1 if its quantized value corresponds





bin ; else Regularity = 0.
B. Per-Rule Sensor Fault Classification
If Regularity = 0, we infer that the sensor might poten-
tially be faulty and classify it into one of 3 types as follows.
Atypical: For each shortlisted rule Rl, if consequent(Rl)∈
sensors(Sg), and Regularity(consequent(Rl), Sg,Rl)=0, then
consequent(Rl) is classified as exhibiting an atypical fault. In
other words, a sensor is classified as atypical if its usage-
behavior deviates from its regular behavior (as defined in the
rule Rl) while the other ‘correlated’ sensors behave normally,
Its anomaly score (AS) is given by
AS(Rl) = [1/(1− confidenceRl) ∗ supportRl] (5)
–i.e., the deviation is considered more noteworthy if, in the
training master set, (a) the antecedent(Rl) and consequent(Rl)
have occurred more frequently (higher support) or (b) the
likelihood of observing consequent(Rl), given antecedent(Rl)
is higher (higher confidence). If the sensor s exhibits atypical
fault over multiple rules, the anomaly scores are summed up.
Missing: If consequent(Rl)/∈ sensors(Sg) and consequent(Rl)
is not already shortlisted as an atypical fault, then
consequent(Rl) is said to be missing, i.e., if a sensor expected
to be present in the segment Sg is entirely absent, it is
classified as missing. The anomaly score is calculated as before
(using Eq. 5) and summed up over all such matching rules.
Spurious: Finally, a sensor s is classified to be spurious if s ∈
sensors(Sg), but doesn’t occur in the antecedent set of any
of the shortlisted rules [RL] i.e. s /∈ antecedent(Rl), (∀Rl ∈
[RL]) nor in the consequents(RL). In other words, if a sensor is
observed to be present in the test segment but was not observed
concurrently with the other reporting sensors (in the Master
segment set during training), it is likely to be a false-alarm
fault. The anomaly score for all those shortlisted rules is then
added to compute the anomaly score.
Via this process, given a segment Sg and an associated
master segment set (i.e., a set of FIM-based rules for a specific
ADL, obtained by mining the ‘training’ data), DetectIF clas-
sifies a faulty sensor into precisely one of {spurious, atypical,
missing} categories and provides a corresponding anomaly
score.
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C. Fault Detection via Aggregation Across All Activities
The final declaration of whether a sensor is faulty (and its
fault type) is then based on this overall anomaly score. Each
activity-specific master set (i.e., ∀Ac ∈ [AC]) has an asso-
ciated set of anomalous sensors along with their anomalous
score and category (Atypical/Missing/Spurious). Subsequently,
for a sensor s ∈ Ac, its activity-specific anomaly score is
multiplied (weighted) by the probability of occurrence of Ac,
and summed up across all activity labels to obtain a total
weighted anomaly score. (In case a sensor s observed in the
segment (s ∈ Sg) is classified as potentially atypical for
some ADLs and spurious for others, the final choice between
spurious and atypical is based on the dominant label among
all the ADLs.) Finally, sensors whose weighted score exceed
a pre-defined threshold (the threshold itself determined from
prior data by the shoulder-locating method) are declared to be
faulty.
D. Repairing the Sensor Stream
After identifying the faulty sensor data using DetectIF’s
detection techniques, we additionally repair the underlying
sensor stream as follows:
1) First, we clean spurious faults in a test segment Sg. A
sensor s classified as spurious fault has its events (or
values) removed from the underlying sensor stream.
2) Next, if a sensor s is identified as exhibiting a atypical or
missing fault, we select the extended association rule Rl
with maximum support that has the maximum number
of elements in (sensors(Rl)
⋂
sensors(Sg)), with the
condition s ∈ sensors(Rl). We then replace sensor
events sSg with the likely behavior denoted by sRl from
the extended association rule. In other words, we restore
the behavior of the sensors that undergo atypical or
missing fault in the test segment with their ‘statistically
representative’ parameter values specified in Rl.
In Section VI-C, we shall demonstrate that such DetectIF-
based repairing helps to improve the accuracy of ADL classi-
fication significantly.
V. METRICS & BASELINES
Before proceeding to the experimental results, we first
summarize the key evaluation metrics and algorithms used to
demonstrate the superior performance of DetectIF.
Fault Evaluation Metrics: We use the two standard metrics
precision and recall to evaluate the ability of DetectIF (and its
competing alternatives) to detect the various types (atypical,
spurious, or missing) of sensor faults.
A. Fault Detection Alternatives (Baseline Algorithms)
We shall compare DetectIF against two widely-used, state-
of-the-art fault detection algorithms.
CLEAN [6]: This algorithm is used primarily to detect spo-
radic faults (‘outliers’) in binary sensors. The approach uses
a hierarchical feature space of [timestamp, location, object,
user], over sensor activations, to quantify the similarity be-
tween any two sensors and cluster sensor events, subsequently
declaring smaller-sized clusters as ‘anomalies’. CLEAN also
assigns a greater weight (likelihood of being noisy) to an event
if the sensor (i) has been diagnosed to be faulty recently or
(ii) has historically exhibited higher failure frequency.
Idea [3]: This approach learns the functional redundancies
(correlation) among multiple sensors, and aims to improve the
robustness of ADL detection in the presence of permanent
sensor failures (‘missing’ faults). To identify sensor failures,
Idea assigns a sensor a continually updated rarity score which
reflects deviations from its expected behavior.
B. Activity Detection Algorithms
To demonstrate DetectIF’s ability to improve ADL detection
accuracy, we shall utilize the following 3 most popular, state-
of-the-art activity detection algorithms: (1) Naive Bayes (NBC)
Detector [17], (2) Hidden Markov Model (HMM) Detector
[18], and (3) Frequent Item set Mining (FIM) based De-
tector [3], [19], each of which operates on individual ADL
segments–i.e., over a collection of sensor events delineated
as belonging to a single ADL. Note that DetectIF is a sensor
error-correction mechanism, and is independent of the specific
ADL detection method chosen.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we use the dataset described in Section
II (Table I) to evaluate the proposed DetectIF approach for
fault detection. We first inject a unified set of synthetic faults,
using the approach described in Section II-C–i.e., selecting a
maximum of 10% of sensors to be faulty in a single time slot,
equi-probably generating, exponentially-distributed (mean =
Ti, Ti ={1s, 10s, 20s, 40s, 1m, 2m, 5m, 10m, 15m, 20m, 30m,
60m}) spurious or missing faults. Using such synthetically
faulty data, we evaluate DetectIF’s ability to (a) detect the
different types of faults (missing, atypical and spurious) and
(b) delineate the corresponding fault duration, compared to the
respective baseline algorithms. We then show how DetectIF-
based cleaning of faults helps to improve the accuracy of
subsequent ADL classification significantly. We subsequently
apply DetectIF to an existing, unmodified dataset (where there
are no explicit fault annotations) to understand its impact–
i.e., see whether it can identify apparent faults that prior
techniques cannot, and quantify the resulting improvement in
ADL recognition accuracy.
A. Fault Detection Accuracy
While the sensor trace contains a combination of all 3 types
of faults (spurious, missing, and atypical), we analyze the fault
detection performance of each type separately.
1) Detecting spurious faults: Figure 4 reports the precision
of detecting spurious faults averaged across all smart homes,
as a function of the mean fault duration Ti. When Ti is 1, i.e.,
when the fault is sporadic, CLEAN (which explicitly targets
sporadic faults) performs slightly better than our approach
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Fig. 4: Precision of detecting Spurious
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Fig. 5: Recall of detecting Spurious
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Fig. 6: Precision and Recall of detecting
Atypical fault in all smart home datasets
for various Ti
TABLE II: Precision(Recall): Spurious fault detection across different smart homes (single & double resident) and sensors (binary &
numeric)
Ti =1 sec Ti =60 sec Ti =20 min Ti =60 min
CLEAN DetectIF CLEAN DetectIF CLEAN DetectIF CLEAN DetectIF
kA-kB-kC 0.82(0.4) 0.75(0.4) 0.81(0.45) 0.82(0.6) 0.61(0.85) 0.94(0.9) 0.56(0.68) 0.93(0.92)
Ar-Ml 0.75(0.33) 0.67(0.49) 0.8(0.5) 0.875(0.59) 0.65(0.75) 0.9(0.89) 0.55(0.74) 0.92(0.91)
T1-T2 0.75(0.4) 0.7(0.37) 0.8(0.45) 0.81(0.5) 0.6(0.75) 0.95(0.8) 0.56(0.65) 0.93(0.87)
TABLE III: Precision(Recall): Missing fault detection across different smart homes (single & double resident) and sensors (binary &
numeric)
Ti =1 sec Ti =60 sec Ti =20 min Ti =60 min
Idea DetectIF Idea DetectIF Idea DetectIF Idea DetectIF
kA-kB-kC 0(0) 0.5(0) 0.2(0.25) 0.67(0.5) 0.67(0.75) 0.88(0.78) 0.82(0.81) 0.90(0.82)
Ar-Ml 0(0) 0.55(0) 0.25(0.25) 0.71(0.51) 0.65(0.78) 0.88(0.79) 0.88(0.83) 0.89(0.83)
T1-T2 0(0) 0.42(0.1) 0.2(0.25) 0.69(0.45) 0.67(0.68) 0.83(0.75) 0.82(0.82) 0.85(0.79)
outperform CLEAN. More specifically, our precision stabilizes
for Ti > 10 minutes, while CLEAN’s performance continues
to deteriorate. This is because with a longer fault duration, the
fault-likelihood (weightage) assigned by CLEAN increases,
implying that the sensor continues to be flagged as faulty
(increasing the false-positive rate) even when the transient
failure has ended. Table II plots the precision values separately
for different types of smart homes (single/double resident)
and sensors (binary/binary+numeric). We see that DetectIF
performs significantly well detecting spurious faults in terms
of precision (up to 95%) in all types of smart homes.
Figure 5 shows corresponding averaged recall values, while
Table II details the changes in recall for individual types of
homes (in brackets). We see that DetectIF’s recall grows as Ti
increases, stabilizing above 80% once Ti exceeds 10 minutes.
Overall, DetectIF outperforms CLEAN across a wider range
of failure behavior.
2) Detecting missing faults: Figures 7 and 8 show the
precision and recall results for missing fault detection averaged
over all smart homes. Similarly, the precision (recall) values
for individual smart homes types are reported in Table III.
In this case, we compare our approaches against Idea (which
explicitly targets such faults). DetectIF has both high precision
(∼88%) and high recall (∼80%) as compared to Idea when the
sensor readings are missing for even modestly long durations
(≥ 20 min). DetectIF outperforms Idea, especially when the
faults are sporadic or highly transient (lower values of Ti)—in
an extreme situation, Idea’s precision/recall = 0 when Ti = 1
sec. Indeed, Idea is built to detect permanent missing faults–
accordingly, its performance improves only when the fault
durations are longer (e.g., Ti = 60 min).
In addition to sporadic/transient missing faults, we also
emulate permanent missing faults in our sensor stream by
emulating ti = ∞ (i.e., once failed, the sensor stays faulty
for the rest of the smart home trace) for 5% of the total
sensors. We evaluated DetectIF using data from 3 separate
representative smart homes, comparing it with Idea in terms
of the time to detection. As shown in Figure 9, DetectIF detects
the missing sensor within an average of 15-20 minutes for all
3 environments, whereas Idea takes >1.5 hours on average
to detect such missing sensors. It appears that DetectIF’s
use of additional statistical features allows it to identify such
faults much faster than Idea, which merely utilizes the binary
absence/presence of a sensor during a specific ADL.
3) Detecting atypical faults: As explained in Section II,
we also introduced a third type of fault – atypical, which
has not been considered in prior work. Atypical faults are
essentially those where a sensor that is expected to fire during
an ADL (i.e., is part of that ADL’s rule antecedents) does fire,
but its statistical behavior is abnormal. Such anomalies are
detected due to the additional statistical features employed by
DetectIF, which prior approaches (such as CLEAN or Idea)
fail to detect. Accordingly, we show the precision and recall
results of only DetectIF in Figures 6. In addition, Tables IV




























 1  60  120  180  240  300
Fig. 7: Precision of detecting Missing
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Fig. 8: Recall of detecting Missing fault
























Fig. 9: Time taken to detect failed sen-
sors across three smart home datasets
TABLE IV: Precision(Recall): Atypical fault detection across dif-
ferent smart homes (single & double resident) and sensors (binary &
numeric)
Ti =1 sec Ti =60 sec Ti =20 min Ti =60 min
kA-kB-kC 0.5(0.4) 0.77(0.53) 0.98(0.96) 0.95(0.95)
Ar-Ml 0.48(0.4) 0.75(0.6) 0.96(0.93) 0.93(0.92)
T1-T2 0.45(0.35) 0.72(0.45) 0.93(0.76) 0.88(0.8)
As can be seen, both precision and recall improve gradually
as Ti is larger, i.e., our approach improves as the failure
duration increases (fault duration becoming transient rather
than random), and stabilizes in case of permanent faults,
obtaining up to ∼95% precision and ∼93% recall in single
user smart homes (both binary and binary+numeric sensor-
equipped). We note that, the regularity feature plays a vital
role in identifying this type of faults. The reason being it is
able to flag a sensor as faulty (based on the abnormality of
its ON/OFF transitions and duration) even when it is normally
expected to be present in an ADL.
TABLE V: Fault duration IoU score for various fault types
Missing Spurious Atypical
Ti = 40s. 5m. 15m. 40s. 5m. 15m. 40s. 5m. 15m.
Aob 0.52 0.57 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.88 0.63 0.71 0.8
Awt 0.65 0.69 0.77 0.8 0.89 0.91 0.78 0.87 0.89
B. Inferring Fault Duration
Besides evaluating the detection accuracy, we also check
how accurate DetectIF is in delineating the total duration
(i.e., (start, end) times) of such faults. To investigate this,
we conducted experiments where we injected faults with 3
different mean durations (Ti= {40 secs, 5 mins, 15 mins}).
To evaluate the accuracy of duration estimation, we utilize
the IoU (Intersection over Union) score–i.e., the ratio of the
intersection of the predicted and actual fault durations to the
the union of these time intervals.
From Table V, we see that DetectIF perform poorly when
the fault duration is small, and the fault type is missing. A
missing sensor is one that is effectively absent during an entire
ADL segment; accordingly, its fault duration (estimated as
the time from its previous activation till the next activation)
implicitly spans across multiple ADL segments. The estimated
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Fig. 10: ADL accuracy (noisy vs. cleaned data): FIM, NBC
and HMM Activity Detection (the latter two in the inset)
(the typical duration of most ADL segments), resulting in low
IoU for short-lived failures. However, this IoU score increases
as Ti increases. On the other hand, we are able to isolate
atypical and spurious faults much accurately, achieving IoU
values of ∼90% across all fault durations.
C. Impact on ADL Detection
To measure the impact of sensor faults (and the subsequent
repair of such faults) on the ultimate goal of activity detection,
we compared ADL detection accuracy before and after the
application of DetectIF to detect and repair sensor faults (see
Section IV-D). Figure 10 plots the results for the 3 different
ADL detection algorithms described in Section V-B, averaged
over all datasets. The top line in three plots signifies the
activity detection performance in the original data, without
any additional synthetically-injected sensor faults, thus repre-
senting the best possible ADL detection performance.
As we see, initially when Ti < 60 sec., ADL detection is
relatively unaffected, even if the underlying faults (noise) are
not cleaned. In other words, sporadic faults do not cause any
significant impairment to ADL detection accuracy. However,
as the mean fault duration Ti increases, the ADL detection
accuracy degrades significantly (dropping to below 50%).
However, when we apply DetectIF to clean the faults, we see
that all 3 algorithms exhibit significant performance improve-
ment, achieving accuracy that is virtually indistinguishable
from the original sensor stream (the one without any added
synthetic faults).
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D. Practical Impact on Existing Datasets
We finally extend our experiments to study the effectiveness
of DetectIF on the original datasets–i.e., without injecting any
synthetic failure data. As the original datasets do not have any
explicit fault annotation, we can study this effectiveness only
indirectly, by quantifying the number of (apparent) faults de-
tected and the resulting impact on ADL recognition accuracy.
For conciseness of exposition, we consider the kB (KasterenB)
dataset (which is known to be inherently noisy) and apply De-
tectIF on the unmodified sensor stream to identify additional
likely faults. For comparison, we use prior fault detection
approaches—{CLEAN, Idea}-as competitive baselines.
On manually examining the sensor patterns flagged out as
anomalous by DetectIF, we observe the likely occurrence of
both permanent and transient faults. For example, sensor 28,
which is installed in the kitchen, is constantly ‘on’ during the
last day of data collection. As an another example, on Day 5,
DetectIF detects a missing “Toilet Door” sensor for the “Use
Toilet” activity. On further inspection we find that, the door
was previously closed in the last “Go to Bed” activity, and
reported to be open in the subsequent “Take Shower” activity
20 minutes later, but was apparently undisturbed during the
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Fig. 11: ADL Detection Accuracy with/without fault detection
& repair on kB dataset. The triplet on each bar represents the
number of unique sensor faults identified by (CLEAN, Idea,
DetectIF) respectively.
We measure how many such unique sensor faults (spu-
rious+missing) DetectIF is able to identify, comparing this
with CLEAN (which detects only spurious presence) and Idea
(which detects only missing presence). As in Section VI-C,
we also quantify the resulting improvement in ADL detection
after repairing such identified faults. Figure 11 presents the
results for the kB dataset for some hand-picked activities: the
triplet on each bar represents how many unique sensor faults
are identified by (CLEAN, Idea, DetectIF) respectively. We see
that DetectIF is always able to detect a larger number of faults
compared to CLEAN and IDEA, and is able to substantially
improve ADL detection accuracy. More specifically, DetectIF
can improve ADL detection accuracy by up to 42% compared
to that achieved in the absence of any fault detection. Also,
ADL recognition accuracy with DetectIF is, on average, 30%
higher than that achieved with either CLEAN or Idea-based
fault detectors.
VII. RELATED WORK
Fault Detection in Wireless Sensor Networks: The prob-
lem of fault detection has received considerable attention in
wireless sensor networks. Much of this work is restricted
either to purely homogeneous sensor networks or to handling
only numeric sensors [20]–[23]. [24] proposes an ARIMA
based framework to detect transient faults, where significant
deviations from time-series predictions of sensor values are
flagged as potential faults. Alternately, [25] exploit Bayesian
methods, built upon spatiotemporal relationships, to detect
faults. All these solutions do not consider heterogeneous
IoT/sensor deployments, containing a mix of numeric and
event-driven sensors.
Several papers [26]–[28] have applied a packet monitoring
based approach for network-level detection of ‘missing’ faults.
There are a few recent research on data failures of heteroge-
neous sensor networks, albeit without the generality of our
DetectIF approach. [29] deploys special instrumentation for
monitoring sensor platform parameters to detect sensor faults
in an agricultural setting. [11] assumes an abstract sensor
model where multiple sensors measure the same variable, and
the inconsistencies among these measurements are used to
detect transient faults. Obviously, in instrumented smart homes
settings such assumptions do not hold.
Fault Detection in Ambient Assisted Living: As explained in
Section V, CLEAN [6] proposes an outlier detection technique
to detect sporadic and systematic spurious faults, whereas Idea
[3] proposes a permanent missing failure detection method.
In Section VI, we have already compared our results with
both CLEAN and Idea. DICE [4] proposes a sensor fault
detection method based on static modeling of sensor transition
probabilities. While DICE technically detects transient faults,
it can do so only when certain transition rules, based on these
probability models, are violated. Consequently, it often takes
up to 30 minutes to detect and identify a fault. DetectIF, on
the other hand, detects faults independently for each distinct
ADL segment. Moreover, sensor correlations and transitions
often vary dramatically based on activities and time of day.
Hence, without considering the complete range of activation
patterns and their contexts, such static probability models
are likely to be less useful. SMART and 6thsense [12], [30]
perform context-aware fault detection by employing multiple
classifiers, each learning activity labels from different subsets
of sensors and comparing their outputs. The complexity for
constructing the classifier profile grows exponentially with
the number of sensors. Further, both approaches treat the
classifiers as black boxes; thus, they are able only to detect a
single failure at a time.
VIII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have presented DetectIF, a novel unified fault detection
approach that can reliably detect a comprehensive set of sensor
faults of various durations (sporadic, transient, permanent) and
types (missing, spurious, atypical). DetectIF builds association
rules for fault detection via spatiotemporal correlation of mul-
tiple sensors and ADL and augments such rules with several
86
features related to the patterns of individual sensor activation.
DetectIF results in significant performance improvement in
real-world smart home benchmark datasets: when tested with
synthetic fault data, it improves the accuracy of sensor fault
detection by ∼30-65%, as well as improves the accuracy of
eventual ADL detection by over 30%. Additionally, applying
DetectIF on existing smart home datasets allows ADL recog-
nition algorithms to achieve 30% higher accuracy, compared
to the use of alternative fault detection techniques. Overall,
DetectIF provides the previously-missing ability to detect
atypical (a category of false-alarms where the anomaly is in
the firing pattern of the sensor) faults; its performance gains
are more pronounced when such faults last for moderately-
long duration (several minutes to hours).
There are, however, several possible future directions for
improvement. At present, DetectIF does not utilize sensor-
specific features (e.g., its mean-time-to-failure, constant off-
sets, or its voltage response [29]) to effectively define a-priori
failure likelihoods; including that in the model (e.g., by adding
a multiplicative term to Equation 5) would be an immediate
future work. Moreover, DetectIF currently detects faults in
an independent, memory-less fashion on each ADL segment.
For faults that are longer in duration or have specific tem-
poral patterns (e.g., periodic every afternoon), incorporating
cross-segment correlation should further improve DetectIF’s
performance. Additionally, it will be useful to combine user
behavior-specific features, and contextually categorize abnor-
mal sensor patterns (e.g. sensor failure due to ambient change,
due to behavior change, or due to a serious health crisis for
instance fall/fire detection) to further enhance the capabilities
of overall smart home assistance system.
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